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The new book of the renowned historian of math-
ematics Jeremy Gray can be succinctly described as a 
rich and thorough study of Western ethnomathemat-
ics in the period of five decades or so (1880–1930) 
preceding and following World War I. What distin-
guishes such a project from more conventional 
Bourbaki–style enterprises is the stress on extra–
mathematical background: social and political 
structures of society, economic practices, forms of 
professional self–organization, and culture.
In fact, culture (represented by visual arts, 
music, philosophy) dominates the discourse at 
several key points, and culture furnished the basic 
metaphor for the book. The time span in question 
is characterized as the period of modernist trans-
formation in mathematics, and the first quotation 
in the Introduction is taken from Guillaume Apol-
linaire’s “The Beginning of Cubism” (1912).
The scope of the book is already ambitious. 
Chronologically, it starts well before the arrival 
of “modernism”: There are brief essays on Monge, 
Poncelet, and projective geometry, followed by 
a discussion of Lobachevsky, Bolyai, and non-
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Euclidean geometry, including a description of 
Gauss’s role in its formation and the subsequent 
contributions of Riemann and Poincaré that led to a 
new vision of what geometry is and what it should 
be. Similar essays on algebra, analysis, “British Al-
gebra and Logic”, and philosophy follow, all of this 
interspersed with information about professional 
organizations, teaching, journals, and quotations 
from contemporary articles and letters. (I cannot 
resist the temptation to reproduce a delightfully 
funny sentence from a letter by C. G. J. Jacobi to 
A. von Humboldt, although in the book it appears 
only considerably later, on page 268:
If Gauss says he has proved something, 
it seems very probable to me; if Cauchy 
says so, it is about as likely as not; if 
Dirichlet says so, it is certain.)
Chapter 2, containing this wealth of informa-
tion, is called “Before Modernism”, and ends with 
a brief synopsis “Consensus in 1880”.
The arrival of mathematical modernism is ad-
dressed in Chapter 3. Again, the discussion is 
consecutively focused on geometry (in particular, 
reemerging connections to physics and Schwarz-
schild’s paper of 1900); then analysis, algebra, 
and logic. With hindsight, the central modernizing 
figure appears in the person of Georg Cantor. Es-
pecially interesting for me were pages discussing 
religious overtones of Cantor’s transcendental 
flights in the infinity of infinities and the related 
subsection on “Catholic Modernism”. (As I have 
written elsewhere, I discern a subtle mockery in 
the famous and often quoted sentence of Hilbert 
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it turned out that Pappus’s Theorem, now taken 
as an axiom, is a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the possibility of introducing projective 
coordinates in P with values in an abstract field (at 
least, if P is infinite). Several more decades elapsed, 
and it was discovered that this latter statement can 
be vastly generalized in the theory of models of 
formal languages: “Zariski geometries” of Zilber 
and Hrushovski describe when abstract sets with 
subsets satisfying certain combinatorial require-
ments can be conceived as sets of solutions of 
arbitrary polynomial equations over a field.
A sine qua non condition of such permanency, 
continuity of preoccupation, is the creation and 
maintenance of a very safe, reliable, 
intergenerational flow of informa-
tion. Linguistic resources of math-
ematics by which this information 
is encoded and transferred are ar-
guably much more variable, fickle, 
subject to sweeping winds of history, 
than the content of the information 
itself.
The whole bulk of discoveries 
of one generation, or one of its ac-
tive but geographically restricted 
subgroups, might in a few decades 
become almost incomprehensible 
to another generation, unless new 
expressive means, with their new 
intuitions and hygienic rules, come 
to the rescue. The old arguments 
are translated into a new language, rewritten, 
purged of perceived obscurities and errors, in the 
process of mastering old results and moving to 
new discoveries.
My professional youth was spent in this exhila-
rating process of assimilation of glorious Italian 
algebraic geometry and recasting it using schemes, 
coherent sheaves, and homological algebra of the 
emerging “new age” algebraic geometry, which in 
two to three decades was to become one of the 
powerful vehicles not only in pure mathematics 
but also in theoretical physics and quantum field 
theory. Perhaps for this personal reason, I became 
perceptive of similar events that took place in 
other times and locations.
From this perspective, “the modernist transfor-
mation of mathematics”, which is the subtitle of 
Jeremy Gray’s book, was one such periodically oc-
curring refurbishing of basic vocabulary, grammar, 
and, yes, aesthetic requirements for mathematical 
thought and mathematical texts. It took about 
thirty years, and its outcomes dominated the next 
thirty years: all in all, just about the span of three 
generations. The fact that during the lives of these 
generations two world wars swept Europe (or, ac-
cording to some accounts, one Thirty Years’ War 
1914–1945) influenced mathematics and the wider 
culture in many ways.
about “Cantor’s Paradise”, usually perceived only 
as unconditional support for set theory).
The subsequent chapters are called “Modernism 
Avowed”, “Faces of Mathematics”, “Mathematics, 
Language and Psychology”, and “After the War” 
and are bursting with information, insight, and 
scholarship. As far as I know, nobody before
Jeremy Gray discussed in this context “Popular-
izing Mathematics around 1900” (section 5.4), or 
“Languages Natural and Artificial” (section 6.1).
Constrained by the restrictions of space, I will 
end this brief survey of the detailed contents of 
this remarkable book and turn to the discussion 
of several of its grand themes, some-
times underlying the exposition and 
sometimes explicitly invoked in it.
Mathematics is a product of civi-
lization: it is discovered or created 
(see discussion below) by a very 
limited number of human beings in 
each generation, then encoded in a 
mixture of words, formulas, and pic-
tures (nowadays software and hard-
ware might be added to this list), and 
in this way transmitted to the next 
generation, which continues this 
process. To estimate the number of 
persons creating mathematics these 
days, one can refer to the attendance 
of International Congresses of Math-
ematicians that are held every four 
years: recently it was about three to five thousand. 
Undoubtedly, this should be viewed as a great 
explosion in comparison with previous centuries. 
In Newton’s time the respective number probably 
did not exceed a few dozen.
One remarkable feature of mathematical knowl-
edge is this: we learn more and more about the 
same objects that ancient mathematicians already 
started to see with their mental eyes: integers and 
prime numbers, real numbers, polynomial equa-
tions in one or many variables, space and various 
space forms… To illustrate this statement, I will 
mention just one string of events. Some time 
around 300 BC, the Hellenistic scholar Pappus dis-
covered a remarkable and, in the Euclidean context, 
quite unusual theorem (see the modernized state-
ment and the picture on page 463 of Gray’s book, 
and beware of a small misprint: B ′ A must be B A′ ). 
Pappus’s Theorem does not conform to the spirit of 
Euclidean geometry, because lengths, angles, and 
rigid plane motions are quite irrelevant here: only 
points, lines, and incidence relations “a point x lies 
on a line X ” play a role. In the nineteenth century it 
was understood that Pappus’s Theorem character-
izes projective geometry of the real plane. When 
an abstract projective plane—as a set of points P , 
with a set of subsets l  ⊂  P called lines—was intro-
duced at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
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is first introduced as “a well established theme in 
writing about modernism”. Later this theme is de-
veloped in the section 4.8, “Anxiety”, already fully 
in the context of the mathematics of the first half 
of the twentieth century, against the background 
of the “crisis of foundations”.
Is it conceivable that Gray’s whole discourse on 
modernism in mathematics is informed by exis-
tential anxiety and that the last section, 7.5, “The 
Work Is Done”, is as self–referential as it sounds?
Of course it is, as the present author willingly 
testifies, relying upon his own experience, and 
as Jeremy Gray himself hints in the last lines of 
page 4.
But before bidding farewell to the reader, let’s 
brace ourselves and try to face the Ghost question 
“What then?”, which I will interpret in the most 
prosaic way, as a question about the direction 
in which self–consciousness of mathematicians 
moved during the last few decades, separated 
by more than a half–century from the 1930s and 
1940s where the detailed analysis of Gray stops.
So far as I can judge, “Platonism” of working 
mathematicians is based on a feeling that impor-
tant mathematical facts are discoveries rather than 
inventions.
The Bering Strait was named after Vitus Ber-
ing who discovered it, whereas the diesel engine 
was named after Rudolf Diesel who invented the 
engine. What about Galois groups? If you feel that 
they were discovered by Évariste Galois, rather 
than invented by him, you are in a sense a Platonist.
I will call such an attitude emotional Platonism in 
order to stress that (in my view) it is intellectually 
indefensible, but not to the least degree invalidated 
by this fact, since our emotions happily resist ra-
tional arguments.
Being such an emotional Platonist myself, I do 
not want to say that all mathematics is a discovery 
of a Platonic world, whatever that could mean. Cer-
tainly, the history of mathematics is also marked 
by inventions of marvelous intellectual telescopes 
and efficient vehicles, allowing people to travel 
from one discovery to another. Moreover, there 
are mathematicians whose oeuvre deserves com-
parison to the Odyssey rather than to Columbus’s 
travelogue, insofar as mathematics is exteriorized 
in texts forming a part of the much vaster general 
culture of the written word.
Elaborating the latter metaphor, one can repre-
sent the history of the “modernist transformation 
of mathematics” simply as a tale about the birth 
and development of a certain style of thought, 
expression, and teaching, starting with Georg Can-
tor and culminating with Bourbaki. Much will have 
to be left out of such a tale, but it could serve as 
a good starting point for guessing “What then?”
This style is formed around a system of pretty 
explicit prescriptions: how a mathematician is sup-
posed to introduce his or her object of study (“what 
The Bourbaki group formed itself in the 1930s 
in a conscious attempt to fill the void left by the 
“lost generation”: not in the somewhat egocentric 
sense of the phrase coined by Gertrude Stein, who 
referred to bohemian American émigrés in Paris, 
but a real and painful void. About 40 percent of 
French mathematicians died in the first world war.
Although my argument posits “the modernist 
transformation” as one of the series of structur-
ally similar transformations that occurred in other 
times and places, both the choice of the time span 
and the use of the adjective “modernist” for it 
seem to me very felicitous. After formulating what 
he sees as characteristic of modernist aesthetics, 
creative psychology, the relationship with society, 
and self–perception, shared by, say, painting and 
mathematics of that period, Jeremy Gray himself 
warns that this looks like a case of “convergent 
evolution” (page 8) rather than an effect of “com-
mon genes”.
In his own sober words: “I am not sure there 
is more than a resonance that links mathematical 
modernism to the arrival of modernity, modern 
capitalism, and its horrific opponent, the Nazi 
state. We are far from knowing much about the 
societies we inhabit.”
In a book largely dedicated to the history and 
philosophy of mathematics, Plato’s name might 
have been invoked in many contexts, but the 
first that comes to mind, that of “Mathematical 
Platonism”, is relegated to the very end of the dis-
cussion, section 7.3, pages 440–452. Besides this 
section 7.3, Jeremy Gray, according to the Index, 
mentions Plato or Platonism on twelve more pages 
scattered throughout the text. By contrast, more 
than fifty entries in the Index invoke Poincaré and 
only slightly fewer, Bertrand Russell.
Why, then, is this monograph called “Plato’s 
Ghost” ? The explanation is on the very first page, 
which quotes in its entirety Yeats’s “What Then?”, 
a poem of four five-line stanzas about an accom-
plished life of an accomplished human being:
Everything he wrote was read,
After certain years he won
Sufficient money for his need;
Friends that have been friends indeed;
“What then?” sang Plato’s ghost, “What 
then?”
The most direct reading of these stanzas sug-
gests to me a simple and universal human emo-
tion, existential anxiety, as beautifully expressed 
by Yeats as by many others before and after him.
Jeremy Gray himself hears in Plato’s voice denial 
of a claim to perfection (page 14). This interpre-
tation is readily accommodated in a chronicle of 
(para)philosophical controversies around math-
ematics. But, significantly, the word “anxious” 
appears already in the first paragraph of the Intro-
duction, and “anxiety” pops up on page 4, where it 
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mathematical logic and botched the respective 
chapters of his Treatise. As a result, the basic new 
discoveries in logic, the Turing–Church Thesis and 
the theories of computability and of complexity, 
suffered because their ties to the mainstream 
mathematics were loosened. Fortunately, such 
researchers as A. N. Kolmogorov helped tighten 
these ties.
What we see now in the flow of mathematical 
research can be termed loosely as a “post-modern” 
period, but the term can be taken literally only if 
we adopt Jeremy Gray’s concept of “modernism”. 
Contemporary mathematics bears no traces or 
connotations of Lyotard’s description of the post-
modern condition, whose main characteristic is 
the loss of credibility of all grand narratives. The 
grand narrative of mathematics is steadily develop-
ing, reaching new depths and new sophistication.
One trend that visibly changes the face of set 
theory as the foundational language of mathemat-
ics is the current popularity of categories (func-
tors, enriched categories, polycategories…) as the 
dialect in which basic definitions of mathematical 
objects are formulated. Another related, but not 
identical, trend is the evolution of homotopy 
theory, which has gradually become a kind of new 
language for postmodern mathematics (for an 
initiated reader, I can mention “brave new rings”).
Briefly, these two trends together revolutionize 
our collective vision of both semantics and syntax 
of the language(s) of mathematics.
First, basic new objects “category” (up to equiva-
lence) and “homotopy type” are not Bourbaki 
structures: they are formed by a class of Bourbaki 
structures that are related by certain equivalence 
relations. Both “class” and “relation” in this state-
ment can be represented set–theoretically by “in-
definitely large” collections of sets.
Accepting this, a working mathematician not 
only sheds the primeval horror of large infinities 
but opens his/her imagination to a radically new vi-
sion even of common objects. For example, natural 
numbers “simply” count things (or cardinalities of 
finite sets), but the history of mathematics teaches 
us how late zero and negative integers were in-
troduced and accepted. External references such 
as the notion of “debt” in trade were necessary in 
order to legitimate negatives. Nowadays integers 
are homotopy classes of pointed loops in a real 
plane with a deleted point: this is a germ of the idea 
of “brave new rings”. Even more generally, “small 
sets” that in the Cantor/Bourbaki paradigms could 
be turned into topological spaces by imposing 
an additional structure now become secondary/
derived objects: say π0 of a homotopy type. The 
traditional view “continuous from discrete” gives 
way to the inverted paradigm: “discrete from 
continuous”.
Second, the notion of formal language that 
crystallized in the 1930s as a purified written 
I am talking about”), how his or her results should 
be stated (“what I am saying”), and finally how one 
should write arguments convincing her/himself 
and potential readers that the stated results are 
correct (“proofs”).
Briefly, the object of study (group, space with 
measure, topological space…) is introduced by a 
definition, presenting it as a Bourbaki–style struc-
ture, which in turn is a collection of Cantorian sets 
satisfying certain relationships stated in terms 
of the basic relation “being an element of” and 
standard logical means. The results are stated as 
theorems, statements of the type “if a structure has 
a certain property P , then it has another property 
Q as well” etc. Finally, proofs are texts written in a 
mixture of natural language, formulas, and some-
times pictures (although the latter are considered 
“bad taste” in the Bourbaki aesthetics). Such a text 
can be considered as a valid proof only if in prin-
ciple it can be replaced by a sequence of statements 
such that each term of this sequence is valid either 
by definition, or can be obtained by an elementary 
logical step from previously obtained statements.
There are several more or less hidden or explicit 
sources of self–referentiality in this picture, of 
which I will mention two.
One is that the notion of mathematical reason-
ing invoked in the previous paragraphs can itself 
be rigidified to become a mathematical structure. 
This was of course the main discovery of the 
formalist program; as soon as it had crystallized, 
Gödel’s and Tarski’s theorems formalizing the 
“liar’s paradox” or Cantor’s diagonal argument 
became inevitable.
Another source of self–referentiality is less for-
mal. Namely, a “proof” presented in a mathemati-
cal paper must convince the reader not just that 
the stated theorem is true, but that it by itself is a 
PROOF, the incarnation of an ideal object residing 
in the Platonic territory of formalized mathemat-
ics. Severe rules of hygiene are imposed upon 
mathematical exposition in order to ensure this. 
The reader must be alerted even to the occurrence 
of an “empty proof” (empty in the set–theoretical 
sense), as Edmund Landau used to practice with 
his inimitable “Beweis: Klar. (Proof: Clear.)”.
The imposition of the hygienic restrictions was 
a part of the reaction to the perceived crisis of 
foundations, but in the real life of mathematics 
of the twentieth century it played another, and 
probably unexpected, role: that of unification of 
many diverse fields of mathematical studies. Alge-
braists, analysts, geometers, probabilists, number 
theorists, logicians could now speak in the same 
language, even when speaking about different 
structures.
Logicists stubbornly struggled in the losing 
battle against this loss of their dominance as 
Keepers of Foundations. Nicolas Bourbaki did not 
really understand the structures emerging in new 
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of knots”, from the physical intuition related to, 
say, “topological quantum field theories” and the 
respective formalism of path integrals. These 
facts could afterwards be investigated and put on 
firm ground by mathematicians: we got “quantum 
topology”, “quantum cohomology” (from string 
theory), and much more.
If you search in the arXiv, MathSciNet, and 
Google for the terms I put in quotation marks 
above, you will find oceans of information about 
this stuff.
At this point, Plato’s apparition intervenes again 
and sings “What then?”
And I respond: “For us, there is only the trying. 
The rest is not our business.”1
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form of natural languages, after it became treated 
as a Bourbaki structure, could be vastly extended. 
Seemingly, there are other Bourbaki structures (or 
better, categories) that have “language–like proper-
ties”, such as categories of graphs. The intuition 
behind considering, say, a directed graph as a 
potential linguistic entity is that of “flowcharts”. 
Generally, computer science, that no–nonsense 
child of mathematical logic, will exert growing 
influence on our thinking about the languages by 
which we express our vision of mathematics.
Finally, I want to discuss briefly the collabo-
ration of mathematicians and physicists, which 
became dormant during the several decades of 
“mathematical modernism” but renewed with new 
vigor after 1950s and 1960s. I will primarily stress 
the benefits of this collaboration for mathematics 
and will describe these benefits as the emergence 
of a vast research program that could be called 
“quantization of classical mathematics”.
This program is historically related to the fact 
that when physicists started to see quantum 
phenomena as the basic natural causes underly-
ing observable classical behavior of matter and 
fields, they had to gradually discover what kind of 
changes must be made in order to proceed from 
a known mathematical description of a classical 
system to a new, quantum description (“quantiza-
tion”), and back (“classical approximation”). Some 
of the discovered prescriptions, such as “deforma-
tion quantization” involving Planck’s constant as 
a small parameter, turned out to be much more 
universal mathematically than suggested just by 
their initial uses.
Another prescription stressing quantum observ-
ables as operators in (generally infinite–dimen-
sional) Hilbert spaces led to “non–commutative 
geometry”, one germ of which was the Heisenberg 
commutation relation, and later to “quantum 
groups”.
Philosophical problems related to the changed 
role of observation and measurement led to dis-
cussions of “quantum logic” and later, in a more 
applied vein, “quantum computation”.
In the 1940s a development started that pro-
duced some mathematical miracles. Richard Feyn-
man developed path integrals, a notion that is 
highly intuitively appealing though mathemati-
cally vague, as well as the powerful machinery of 
Feynman diagrams, which are well understood 
mathematically but are motivated only by the 
idea that they somehow capture path integrals. It 
was a great success in quantum field theory and 
elementary particles, but nobody could foresee 
how, in mathematics, it would backfire.
This became reality after many physics papers 
of Witten and his collaborators, which math-
ematicians could interpret as rich and powerful 
heuristic tools to guess precise and striking new 
mathematical facts, such as “quantum invariants 
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